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PANEL III: INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE IN MEDIA PRODUCTS 
 
COMMENTARY 
 
GLOBALISM AND NATIONAL MEDIA 
POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
AND CANADA: A CRITIQUE OF C. 
EDWIN BAKER’S MEDIA, MARKETS, 
AND DEMOCRACY 
Jerome A. Barron* 
I. INTRODUCTION  
In democratic societies, Canada and Western Europe for ex-
ample, enthusiasm for free trade quickly dissolves when the 
product involved is a media product.1  The United States obvi-
ously has an advantage in insisting that free trade should em-
brace free trade in media content no less than with other com-
modities.  To assist it, the U.S. can bring to bear its dominance 
in the business of producing and distributing media content.  It 
can also rely on the rhetoric of American First Amendment 
  
 * Harold H. Greene Professor of Law, George Washington University 
Law School.   I would like to thank Professor Florian Sauvageau, Director, 
Laval University Center of Media Studies, Quebec City, Quebec, Canada for 
his invaluable assistance on the Canadian media law section of this Book 
Review and my colleague Professor Amitai Eztioni, George Washington Uni-
versity, for his thoughtful comments.  My thanks as well to Ryan Wallach for 
his assistance on Federal Communications Commission waiver policy.  I 
would also like to thank Leslie Lee, Assistant Director for Administration, 
Jacob Burns Law Library, for her excellent bibliographic assistance; Mark 
Hershfield of the George Washington University Law School Class of 2003 for 
his excellent research assistance and Katherine Poon-Sham for her excellent 
secretarial help. 
 1. See C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, M ARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 217 (W. Lance 
Bennett & Robert M. Entman eds., 2002). 
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law.2  Surely, the argument runs, if free trade should be ap-
plied anywhere, it is free trade in ideas.  The marketplace of 
ideas should be untrammeled and national boundaries should 
be no barrier to the life of ideas.  Professor C. Edwin Baker out-
lines in convincing detail the steadfastness with which the U.S. 
has maintained this position. 
In his book Media, Markets, and Democracy,3 Professor 
Baker, in a chapter entitled “Trade, Culture and Democracy,” 
presents a subtle and sensitive discussion of the complexities 
inherent in considering the merits of free trade in media con-
tent.  He warns us that yielding to arguments against Ameri-
can domination of the global market in media content may, in 
many countries, result in the substitution of government dis-
tortion for market distortion.4  He warns, therefore, against the 
categorical exclusion by one country of media content originat-
ing in another country.  That, he states, is not the solution for 
imbalances in the production quality and delivery of media con-
tent among the nations of the world.   As he puts it, categorical 
exclusion of imported media content will “stunt discourse.”5 
Professor Baker, however, is keenly aware that the media 
marketplace is imperfect and subject to market failure.6  This 
market failure has important consequences.    The media prod-
ucts that prevail in the unregulated market often do not ade-
quately serve the needs of smaller political and informational 
groups within society.   Moreover, the unregulated media mar-
ket fails because it does not appropriately identify, and is insuf-
ficiently egalitarian “in weighing people’s desires for democ-
ratically relevant speech.”7  Furthermore, international trade 
in media content accelerates the dissipation of local media and 
weakens its centrality to the media’s democratic functions.8  On 
the whole, Baker doubts that unrestricted free trade in media 
content in the global media marketplace is supportive either of 
national or of global democracy.9  
  
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 3. BAKER, supra note 1, at 245-75. 
 4. Id. at 254-55. 
 5. Id. at 255.  
 6. See id. at 246. 
 7. Id.  
 8. See id.  
 9. See BAKER, supra note 1, at 260-61. 
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This Book Review serves as a critique of Professor Baker’s 
recent work, examining particular chapters as well as respond-
ing to his overall thesis.  In Part II, the Review examines the 
chapter “Trade and Economics” and the impact of unrestrained 
global free trade upon local and national media content.  Part 
III will address Baker’s “culture of dialogue” and the need, or 
lack thereof, for its protection from unrestricted global free 
trade in media content.  Part IV will explore Baker’s suggestion 
that a “media specific” remedy may be available to resolve ten-
sions between free international trade and globalization on the 
one hand, and the fostering of cultures of dialogue and the 
maintenance of local media institutions on the other.  Part V 
will discuss the impact of the First Amendment on media regu-
lation in the U.S., and how these regulations are being evaded 
in the name of the Constitution.  Part VI will explore develop-
ments in Canadian media concentration, and how cross-
ownership is actually being hailed as the stimulus for the eco-
nomic health of that country’s media enterprises. 
II. FREE TRADE IN MEDIA CONTENT 
In the chapter of his book entitled “Trade and Economics,” 
Professor Baker undertakes an economic analysis of the impact 
of unrestrained global free trade on local or national media 
content.  In light of this analysis, he contends that some forms 
of governmental intervention, such as subsidies, are necessary 
in democratic societies to preserve and nurture local media.10  
Moreover, subsidies are not the only means by which national 
governments can seek to assure that some minimum level of 
local content survives.   Mandating “screen quotas” of locally 
produced movies by national movie theaters and  “broadcast 
time quotas” mandating local or domestic programming for a 
certain percentage of the programming on the broadcast day 
are other favored alternatives.11  In democratic societies, “ro-
bust domestic media content” is essential, and “[r]estraints on 
imports can protect and promote these essential domestic 
products.”12      
  
 10. See id. at 232 (“This economic justification for subsidies applies 
uniquely to local media products disadvantaged by the free trade regime.”). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 238 (emphasis added). 
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In the United States, the protection of local broadcast media 
content has historically been accomplished through govern-
ment intervention.  The “must-carry” rule is an example.13  Lo-
cal cable systems are required to allocate a certain percentage 
of their channel capacity to local over-the-air broadcasters.14  
Since most television viewers in the U.S. are cable subscribers, 
Congress provided for must-carry to preserve local over-the-air 
broadcasting.  Local broadcasters contended that, without 
must-carry, their survival would be in economic jeopardy.15  If 
broadcasters were limited to the over-the-air audience and de-
prived of the cable audience, the remaining broadcast audience 
would be too fragmented to financially support over-the-air 
“free” broadcasting.16  The result would be a kind of informa-
tion apartheid.      
If local over-the-air broadcast stations were no longer eco-
nomically viable, those who could not afford to subscribe to ca-
ble television would be deprived of free television altogether.   
Programming directed to issues and problems unique to the 
local community might be deprived of any television time at all.   
This is indeed what Professor Baker thinks occurs on the in-
ternational level.17  Baker is against absolute prohibitions on 
imports of foreign media content. On that issue he is a free 
marketer.  On the issue of what control nation-states should 
have with respect to the protection of locally originated media 
  
 13. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 
1992, 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-535 (1994) [hereinafter Cable Act].    
 14. Id.  
 15. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 512 
U.S. 622, 634 (1994) [hereinafter Turner I] (“Congress concluded that unless 
cable operators are required to carry local broadcast stations . . . ‘the eco-
nomic viability of free local broadcast television and its ability to originate 
quality local programming will be seriously jeopardized.’” (quoting H.R. REP. 
No. 102-628, at 74 (1992)). 
 16. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 520 
U.S. 180, 226 (1997) [hereinafter Turner II] (Justice Breyer, speaking for the 
plurality, justified must-carry as necessary in order to avoid “too precipitous 
a decline in the quality and quantity of programming choice for an ever-
shrinking non-cable-subscribing segment of the public.”). 
 17. See BAKER, supra note 1, at 238 (“[I]mports often will replace domestic 
media products that are more oriented toward crucial local needs.”) (empha-
sis added). 
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content and the limiting of foreign media content, he favors 
governmental intervention — at least in democratic societies.18 
A theme that runs through Baker’s chapter on “Trade and 
Economics” is that the market does not necessarily give people 
the media content that they want.19  People can opt for the 
market, or opt for government restraints on that market.   But 
free market rhetoric should not be allowed to trump the normal 
workings of democratic society: “People can get the media they 
want only if they have the right to adopt rules that determine 
how wants are identified and weighed.  These decisions could 
show that people will obtain the media they want only through 
rules that interfere with free trade.”20 
III. A CULTURE OF DIALOGUE 
Although Professor Baker is skeptical about whether free 
trade in media content will serve democratic societies, his dis-
cussion of this complex issue is quite nuanced.  Indeed, he in-
sists on a fundamental distinction between the kind of culture 
or media content which should be exempted from unrestricted 
free trade, and the kind of culture or media content which 
should not.  In assessing the merits of global free trade in me-
dia content, he distinguishes between two kinds of media con-
tent involving two conceptions of national culture — the first 
being a culture of dialogue, the other an artifact or museum 
conception of culture.21  This artifact or museum conception of 
culture is described as perceiving culture and cultural integrity 
as “relatively static, largely backward-looking, and very much 
  
 18. See id. at 234.  He states:  
 
At the stage of final choice, liberal democracy must leave decisions 
in the hands of individuals.   However, the choice of structures or le-
gal frameworks is an inherently collective matter. . . .  [R]ather than 
relying blindly on the market, the more appropriate response is for 
the parties most affected to reach a judgment through the only 
mechanism available to them to make structural decisions: residents 
of each country should express their judgments through their politi-
cal order.    
Id.  
 19. Id. at 222. 
 20. Id. at 242. 
 21. See id. at 249-51. 
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content-oriented.”22   Free trade threatens the content of the 
museum conception of culture.   But there is no merit in insu-
lating this conception of culture from the consequences of 
global free trade in media content.  The implication is that if 
free trade in media content erodes or destroys a museum con-
ception of culture, then so be it. 
The culture of dialogue, however, merits a much greater de-
gree of protection from unrestricted global free trade in media 
content.   In a helpful explanation of what he means by a cul-
ture of dialogue, Baker identifies the aspects of a culture of dia-
logue which merit protection.23 The watchwords of a culture 
worth protecting are characterized by “pluralism, diversity, 
citizen opportunity, choice, creativity and participation.”24   
These characteristics of a culture of dialogue have an obvious 
affinity with both First Amendment theory and First Amend-
ment tradition.  Professor Baker further describes the culture 
of dialogue as: 
Discourse or dialogue makes participants, rather than con-
tent, central to culture.  In discourse, it matters who the 
speaker and who the audience are.  The speaker and audience 
typically struggle with the same concerns. . . .   In this dia-
logic conception, culture is necessarily a living practice. Like 
all practice, discourses of identity and value require a context, 
which makes a cultural heritage crucial.  Thus, [the dialogic] 
conception treats culture as the integration of a spec ific heri-
tage into a current behavioral discourse.  Addition, develop-
ment, and, som etimes, rejection of particular cultural content 
are inherent in this dialogic conception of culture.  25    
This explanation is an appeal, and a worthy one, for a non-
nationalist use of the past.  But it also suggests many connec-
tions with a museum conception of culture.   The explanation 
seems to blur rather than sharpen the distinction.26  Baker 
  
 22. Id. at 250. 
 23. See BAKER, supra note 1, at 250.  
 24. Id. at 253. 
 25. Id. at 250-51. 
 26. Later on in discussing and extolling the culture of dialogue, Professor 
Baker says:  “Dialogues oriented to forging and understanding ‘national’ 
identity (or identities), whatever the current depth of these identities, are 
crucial for a democratic political order.”  Id. at 257.  In application, it would 
be very difficult to clearly distinguish dialogue oriented to forging national 
identity from  “backward-looking” content.  
 4/19/02 6:39:34 PM 
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presents a kind of Manichean divide between the artifact or 
museum concept of culture and the dialogue concept of cul-
ture.27   The artifact concept of culture should be subjected to 
the ravages of free trade in media products; it does not merit 
protection or protectionism.  The dialogic conception of culture, 
however, can be properly shored up by government interven-
tion such as subsidies.  National identity can hardly be forged 
without some reference to a nation or a people’s past and a cor-
responding effort to preserve the culture that the past reflects.  
This line between an artifact concept of culture and a culture of 
dialogue is too imprecise.  For that reason, I will use the neu-
tral term “media content.”   Whatever the merits of the distinc-
tion between national media policies or cultures — the culture 
of dialogue which merits defense from trade and the artifact or 
museum concept of culture which does not — I think one must 
take into account the view of a media critic who feels that na-
tional media policies, of whatever character, are increasingly at 
risk and subject to erosion and capture.28  An outspoken propo-
nent of this view is Professor Richard McChesney of the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin.  Consider his assessment:  
[T]he impetus behind the global media system is far more 
corporate and commercial expansion than national geopolitics 
. . . .  [T]he system is moving away from direct attachment to 
a particular nation-state. . . .  [T]he always dubious notion 
that the product of the corporate media firms represents the 
essence of U.S. culture appears ever less plausible as the me-
dia system is increasingly concentrated, commercialized, and 
globalized. . . .  There is no discernible difference in the firms’ 
content, whether they are owned by shareholders in Japan or 
  
 27. See id. at 250-51.  He states:  
 
In the artifact view, culture and cultural integrity are relatively 
static, largely backward-looking, and very much content-oriented. . . .  
Contrast this artifact conception with a second one, which I referred 
to as the “discourse” or “dialogic” conception of culture.  Discourse or 
dialogue makes participants, rather than content, central to culture.  
Id. 
 28. See ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY : 
COMMUNICATION POLITICS IN DUBIOUS TIMES 103-04 (Robert W. McChesney & 
John C. Nerone eds., 1999). 
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Belgium or have corporate headquarters in New York or Syd-
ney.29 
There is an implication in Professor Baker’s analysis that a 
national media policy — a culture of dialogue — can effectively 
resist the emerging global media culture.  Professor McChes-
ney is much more pessimistic in this regard.30   Whether local 
media, national cultures and national media policies will sur-
vive is a matter about which I, like Professor Baker, am more 
hopeful.  In this regard, I think Baker’s proposed preservation 
of a culture of dialogue provides a needed goal.  
IV. A MEDIA ANTIDOTE FOR GLOBALISM?   
As an advocate of national media policies which foster cul-
tures of dialogue in democratic countries, it is not surprising to 
find that Professor Baker says that he is “skeptical of interna-
tional trade specifically and [of] globalization generally.”31    
But he is optimistic about the possibilities of national commer-
cial media at least if some degree of governmental intervention 
is permitted.32  He suggests that there may be a “media-
specific” remedy for economic globalization.33   
Is it possible that free trade in media content may counteract 
rather than reinforce “economic globalization?”34  When one 
speaks about relying on the national media as a counterpoise to 
global domination by multinational corporations, it is best to 
recognize that the most powerful media corporations are them-
selves multinational corporations.  Here, again, Professor 
McChesney provides some harsh truths.  He argues that na-
tional commercial media should not be regarded “as some sort 
of oppositional or alternative force to the global market.”35  By 
virtue of media consolidation and concentration, media con-
glomerates dominate “regional and national markets” the 
  
 29. Id.  
 30. See id. at 104 (“[T]he notion that the transnational media conglomer-
ates will ultimately fail because people tend to prefer their local media and 
cultures appears wide of the mark.”).   
 31. BAKER, supra note 1, at 261. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id.  
 35. MCCHESNEY, supra note 28, at 107. 
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world over.36   In McChesney’s view, these national and re-
gional media firms aspire either to be bought up by the multi-
national media giants or at least to participate in joint ven-
tures with them.   As an incentive for their acquisition, they 
cheerfully offer  “the ‘local’ aspect of the content” and their ex-
pertise in dealing with the local politicians.37 
Professor Baker is hardly unaware of arguments such as 
those made by Professor McChesney.  Indeed, he probably 
agrees with McChesney’s overall assessment.  Nonetheless, out 
of a sense of balance and fairness, Baker sets forth some of the 
salient points, pro and con, in the argument that there may be 
a media specific remedy for economic globalization.38 Since the 
engines of economic globalization are the multinational corpo-
rations that generate more revenue than the domestic products 
of most nation-states, and since unregulated economic entities 
often turn lawless, only legal regulation, preferably from de-
mocratic governments, can successfully channel corporate 
power to more socially beneficial uses.   Nonetheless, one must 
also recognize that many countries are less powerful than the 
multinational corporations they might seek to constrain.   The 
result is that  “[i]n many respects, these corporations are the 
world’s new sovereigns.”39 
One possible remedy for the sovereign state dwarfed by the 
power of multinational corporations is the development of 
global government institutions.   Multinational institutions 
should govern multinational corporations.  The problem, how-
ever, is that existing international global institutions such as 
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Trade Organization lack transparency and fail to be de-
mocratically responsive.40  How can we, in these circumstances, 
develop a  “global public sphere?”41  The mass media is the 
critical tool necessary to forge a global public sphere.   Argua-
bly, the inevitability of economic globalization underscores the 
need for free trade in media products and the “need for global 
  
 36. Id. at 106. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See BAKER, supra note 1, at 261-66. 
 39. Id. at 262. 
 40. See id.  
 41. Id.  
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media and global circulation of media.”42   The creation of   pub-
lic opinion through global media will preserve democratic dis-
course.  But Baker is not optimistic that the creation of a global 
public sphere and of global institutions to counteract economic 
globalization could be successful.43   Unlike Professor McChes-
ney, he believes that “the more democratic structure of nation-
states”  will make resistance to economic globalization more fea-
sible.44   This, of course, immediately presents the question: 
Don’t the same factors which lead to economic globalization 
find a parallel on the nation-state level?  The reference here is 
to the centrifugal contra-local pressures driven by technological 
advancement and economic concentration.  
Professor Baker makes the following observations in re-
sponse to these developments: “[U]nadorned reliance on mar-
kets has been inadequate for the public spheres democratically 
required by traditional nation-states.  Democracy within a 
country is better served by appropriate government interven-
tions in the media order.”45   I next propose to examine this ap-
proach by analysis of government media interventionist polices 
in the U.S. and Canada.  
V. MEDIA POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 
In the United States, government interventions in the eco-
nomic structure of the media order already exist.  Despite in-
creasing concentration of the media, however, even the fairly 
weak existing regulatory controls in the U.S. on the economic 
structure of media organizations are not only under assault, 
they are in danger of being completely scrapped.  Ironically, 
this assault is undertaken in the name of the First Amend-
ment. 
The broadcasting system of the United States was founded 
on the idea that the local broadcaster is the trustee for his 
community.46  Since all could not be licensed, the licensee was 
  
 42. Id.  
 43. See id. 
 44. BAKER, supra note 1, at 263. 
 45. Id. at 265. 
 46. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 395 U.S. 
367 (1969).  Justice White summarized the trusteeship role of the local 
broadcast licensee for the Court in Red Lion :  
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entrusted for a limited period with a portion of the airways.    
The license was granted to the licensee on condition that the 
licensee performs in the public interest.47   This public interest 
obligation, grounded in the licensee’s duty to serve its commu-
nity, obliged it to broadcast the issues and ideas that were im-
portant to the community covered by the license.  Many of the 
Federal Communication Commission’s (“FCC”) long established 
regulatory policies are based at least in part on the importance 
of assuring diversity of expression by reducing the control that 
any one media company can have over the national opinion 
process.48   Illustrative are the current fortunes of one such 
  
There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Gov-
ernment from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others 
and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to 
present those views and voices which are representative of his com-
munity and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the 
airwaves.   
Id. at 389.  Justice White further observed:  
 
It does not violate the First Amendment to treat broadcast licensees 
given the privilege of using scarce radio frequencies as proxies for 
the entire community, obligated to give suitable time and attention 
to matters of great public concern.  To condition the granting or re-
newal of licenses on a willingness to present representative commu-
nity views on controversial issues is consistent with the ends and 
purposes of these constitutional provisions forbidding the abridg-
ment of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.  
Id. at 394. 
 47. See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943).  Jus-
tice Frankfurter summarized for the Court the rationale of the Federal 
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-614 (1994) [hereinafter Com-
munications Act], as regards broadcast regulation, stating that: “[T]he ‘public 
interest’ to be served under the Communications Act is thus the interest of 
the listening public in ‘the larger and more effective use of radio.’” Id. at 216 
(quoting 47 U.S.C. § 303(g)).  He goes on to state:  
 
The facilities of radio are limited and therefore precious; they cannot 
be left to wasteful use without detriment to the public interest.  “An 
important element of public interest and convenience affecting the 
issue of a license is the ability of the licensee to render the best prac-
ticable service to the community reached by his broadcasts.”   
Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 216  (quoting Fed. Communications Comm’n v. 
Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940)). 
 48. See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 240 
F.3d 1126, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Time Warner II].  Judge 
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regulatory policy here in the U.S.  In broadcasting and cable we 
have what are called “national audience caps.”49   These caps 
limit the share of the national audience that any one company 
may capture.  Audience caps do not directly limit the extent of 
a media company’s holdings, but they do so indirectly by limit-
ing the size of the audience any one company can reach.  These 
restrictions do not have their source in a desire to censor.  In-
stead, in an age of ever increasing media concentration, they 
have their origin in a desire to curtail the influence any one 
media company may have over the national opinion process.        
The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition 
Act of 1992 (“1992 Cable Act”) directs the FCC to limit the 
number of cable subscribers a cable company may reach.50 The 
FCC responded to this directive by establishing a rule that no 
one company may reach more than 30% of the national cable 
audience.51  The statute permitting the FCC to establish this 
rule was challenged by the Time Warner Entertainment Co. 
(“Time Warner”) on First Amendment grounds.  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the 
  
Stephen Williams summarized the FCC’s long-established policy on this 
point, stating:  
 
The [FCC] is on solid ground in asserting authority to be sure that 
no single company could be in a position single-handedly to deal a 
programmer a death blow.  Statutory authority flows plainly from 
the instruction that the [FCC’s] regulations “ensure that no cable 
operator or group of cable operators can unfairly impede, either be-
cause of the size of any individual operator  or because of joint actions 
of operators of sufficient size, the flow of video programming from 
the video programmer to the consumer.”   
Id. (quoting Cable Act, 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(2)(A) (1994)). 
 49. See 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(1); Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-104 § 202(c)(1)(B), 110 Stat. 56, 111 (1996) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 
73.3555(e)(1) (2001)). 
 50. 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(1)(A) (“In order to enhance effective competition, the 
Commission shall . . . conduct a proceeding . . . to prescribe rules and regula-
tions establishing reasonable limits on the number of cable subscribers a 
person is authorized to reach through cable systems owned by such person or 
in which such person has an attributable interest.”).   
 51. The FCC cable audience cap imposed a 30% limit on the number of 
subscribers that may be served by a multiple system cable operator.  See 47 
C.F.R. § 76.503 (2001); Implementation of Section 11(c) of the Cable Televi-
sion Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 14 F.C.C.R. 19,098, 
19,127-28, ¶¶ 71-73 (1999) [hereinafter Third Report]. 
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constitutional validity of the 1992 Cable Act provision directing 
the FCC to establish audience caps for the cable industry.52   
The court of appeals rejected the effort of the cable companies 
to dress their cause in the imagery and standards of the First 
Amendment.53  
Is it reasonable for Congress to conclude that concentration 
of ownership is a threat to “the diversity of information avail-
able to the public?”54   Judge Douglas Ginsberg of the D.C. Cir-
cuit stated the rationale for an audience cap in the cable indus-
try: concern about increasing concentration of ownership in the 
cable industry.55  The concentration placed diversity and com-
petition in jeopardy.56  Therefore, it was reasonable to conclude 
that caps would reduce the level of concentration, thereby in-
creasing the degree of diversity of programming sources.57 
In analyzing national responses to the phenomenon of global 
media issues, Professor Baker has adopted Professor Oliver 
Goodenough’s distinction between “‘strong protection’” which 
  
 52. See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. United States, 211 F.3d 1313 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Time Warner I].  The cable companies contended that 
they had a First Amendment right to speak to any audience that they would 
otherwise be able to reach.  Id. at 1321.  By restricting the number of sub-
scribers a cable company could reach, the government was limiting their 
right to speak. Id.  Actually, what was being curtailed was the cable com-
pany’s right to sell.  No single denominator describes the program of content 
of large multiple system cable operators.  Program content is more likely 
driven by economics — the result of negotiation between the cable system 
and the cable programmer.  Government regulation such as audience caps 
should be viewed less as content-based speech or even as content neutral 
speech but instead as regulation that is indifferent to content.  Basically, this 
latter view is the one the court accepted.  See id. 
 53. The court had quite a different take on the policy behind audience 
caps.  Judge Douglas Ginsberg expressed the court’s view quite succinctly.  In 
authorizing caps in the cable industry, Congress was not valuing one speaker 
over another, or even one category of speech over another, but instead simply 
insisting that there be multiple speakers.  Id. at 1318.  “[I]ts concern [of Con-
gress in enacting audience caps] was not with what a cable operator might 
say, but that it [the cable operator] might not let others say anything at all.”  
Id.  
 54. Time Warner I, 211 F.3d at 1320. 
 55. Senate Report 102-92 accompanying the 1992 Cable Act noted that by 
1990, the five largest operators served almost half the country’s cable sub-
scribers.  See id. at 1319; S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 32 (1991), reprinted in 1992 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1165. 
 56. See Time Warner I, 211 F.3d at 1320. 
 57. Id. at 1322. 
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has an exclusionary goal, and “‘weak protection’” which is de-
signed to promote choice by keeping domestic products in exis-
tence.58  In a sense, in the domestic sphere one can look at the 
audience cap as a regulatory mechanism which allows a great 
deal of concentration but still keeps smaller media companies 
in business as a form of weak protectionism.  In addition, it 
should be kept in mind that audience caps, like other FCC 
regulations, may be waived at the discretion of the FCC on pe-
tition of the parties.59  The audience cap constraint therefore is 
not inflexible.  One could therefore say that the cable audience 
cap is the kind of government intervention in the media order 
that Baker would favor.      
However, one should be cautious about the durability of 
these and other media regulatory regimes.   On March 2, 2001, 
the First Amendment case against audience caps got new life 
when the D.C. Circuit struck down the FCC imposed 30% limit 
on the audience reach any one cable company can have.60  Al-
though the court of appeals stood by its previous ruling uphold-
ing the statutory authority of the FCC to impose an audience 
cap on the cable industry, the court struck down the FCC’s au-
dience cap for cable on the grounds that the 30% limit failed to 
meet the standard of review usually used in cable cases.61   The 
  
 58. BAKER, supra note 1, at 267 (quoting Oliver R. Goodenough, Defending 
the Imaginary to the Death? Free Trade, National Identity and Canada’s Cul-
tural Preoccupation, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 202, 209-210 (1998)). 
 59. In a case dealing with a cable audience cap, the FCC stated that its 
waiver authority was based on 47 C.F.R. § 1.3, which states that FCC rules 
may be waived for good cause shown but that the waiver applicant faces a 
“high hurdle.” See Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Li-
censees and Section 214 Authorizations From MediaOne Group, Inc., Trans-
feror, to AT&T Corp., Transferee, 15 F.C.C.R. 9816, 9846-49, ¶¶ 65-70 (2000). 
 60. See Time Warner II, 240 F.3d 1126, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2001).   
 61. Id.  Judge Williams, in Time Warner II, applied the test set forth in 
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).  The Supreme Court had 
applied the O’Brien test to the must carry obligations imposed by Congress 
on the cable industry in Turner II.  See Turner II, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997).  
Judge Williams described the test as follows: “[A] governmental regulation 
subject to intermediate scrutiny will be upheld if it ‘advances important gov-
ernment interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not 
burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests.’”  
Time Warner II, 240 F.3d at 1130 (quoting Turner II, 520 U.S. at 189).  
Unlike the must-carry rules which the Supreme Court upheld applying the 
O’Brien test, Judge Williams found that the FCC’s 30% cable audience cap 
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FCC’s basis for setting a 30% standard was held to be entirely 
conjectural and, therefore, burdened substantially more speech 
than was necessary.62  The judicial invalidation of the 30% 
limit shows that the media industry can effectively use the 
First Amendment to overturn economic judgments of govern-
ment that affect their industry.  The use of the First Amend-
ment in this case to strike down the limit is reminiscent of eco-
nomic substantive due process of the Lochner era.63 
Audience caps have been applied to broadcasting as well.  
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 actually sets a 35% audi-
ence cap in broadcasting.64   Recent mergers, particularly the 
CBS Corporation-Viacom Inc. merger,65 have greatly increased 
the pressure on the FCC to abolish the 35% cap, increase the 
cap or grant liberal waivers.  Obviously, the success of the ca-
ble industry in getting a court to strike down the 30% audience 
cap in cable has energized the broadcast industry’s effort to do 
likewise with respect to the 35% cap in broadcasting.   Re-
cently, these efforts have yielded some success.  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has re-
  
rule failed the O’Brien test since the FCC had failed to make a record demon-
strating the basis for a 30% cap.  Id. 
 62. Time Warner II, 240 F.3d at 1137. 
 63. See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  Time Warner 
made two First Amendment challenges to the validity of the audience cap in 
the cable industry.  The First Amendment challenge to the statute directing 
the FCC to set an audience cap for the cable industry is a good example of 
current corporate media use of the First Amendment.  Clearly, in this case, 
Time Warner’s purpose was to protect and dominate industry markets and 
not in any way to express a point of view.  In this context, media industry 
First Amendment protections have a kind of cynical ring to them.  In the case 
of the statute, the First Amendment ploy did not work.  See generally Time 
Warner I,  211 F.3d 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  But in the case of the First 
Amendment challenge to the 30% limit established by the FCC, the First 
Amendment ploy was eminently successful.  See Time Warner II, 240 F.3d at 
1126. 
 64. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104 § 202(c)(1)(B), 
110 Stat. 56, 111 (1996) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e)(1) (2001)). 
 65. See Verlyn Klinkenborg, The Vision Behind the CBS-Viacom Merger, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1999, at A28; Press Release, Viacom Inc., Viacom and 
CBS to Complete Merger Tomorrow (May 3, 2000), available at 
http://www.viacom.com/press.tin?ixPressRelease=45002243. 
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manded the 35% audience cap rule in broadcasting to the FCC 
so that it may determine whether to repeal or modify the rule.66 
In his chapter on “Trade, Culture and Democracy,” Professor 
Baker argues that the achievement of global democracy re-
quires “national capacity to restrain and supplement free trade 
[by] . . . interventions designed to assure vigorous domestic 
media serving national, cultural, and political discourse func-
tions.”67    Audience caps serve that objective.  Unfortunately, 
examination of the current status and future of existing regula-
tory constraints such as audience caps indicates, to say the 
least, that their future is not bright. 
Audience caps are not the only regulatory constraint on me-
dia concentration in the United States.    The U.S., unlike its 
neighbor Canada, has a rule prohibiting cross-ownership. In 
1975, the FCC set forth the cross-ownership rule prohibiting 
the prospective or future licensing or transfer of a broadcast 
station to a company that owned a newspaper in the same 
community.68  This rule left the greatest number of cross-
ownership situations in the U.S. unaffected.  Existing cross-
ownership combinations were essentially grandfathered.69   
In 1978, those challenging the FCC’s cross-ownership rule 
sought to use the First Amendment as a sword to strike the 
rule down.  The Supreme Court responded to their efforts by 
relying on the First Amendment as a justification for the regu-
lation.70  The objective of the cross-ownership rule is to achieve 
  
 66. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 280 
F.3d 1027, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  The court of appeals explained that it did 
so because, inter alia, the FCC’s decision to retain the rule was “arbitrary 
and capricious.”  Id.  The FCC failed to provide an adequate rationale for its 
decision.  The court of appeals held further that the 35% broadcasts audience 
cap did not violate the First Amendment.  The court also declined to vacate 
the rule as the networks had requested.  Id. 
 67. BAKER, supra note 1, at 266. 
 68. See Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73.240 and 73.636 of the Commis-
sion’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television 
Broadcast Stations, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1975), as amended Amendment of 
Sections 73.34, 73.240 and 73.636 of the Commission’s Rules Relating to Mul-
tiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, 53 
F.C.C.2d 589 (1975) (codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.34, 73.240, 73.636 (1976)). 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Fed. Communications Comm’n v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 
436 U.S. 775, 801-02 (1978).  The FCC was the federal agency charged with 
regulating broadcasting in the public interest and its judgment that the issu-
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the culture of dialogue Professor Baker seeks.  Justice Thur-
good Marshall, writing the cross-ownership opinion, rational-
ized its validity on the basis of First Amendment policy rather 
than antitrust policy.71  The cross-ownership rule reflects a cer-
tain leap of First Amendment faith, based on the underlying 
notion that a larger number of smaller and independently 
owned media in a community are more likely to yield diverse 
and original voices.72  Clearly, regulatory policies such as audi-
ence caps and the cross-ownership rule fall under the rubric of 
what Baker styles “appropriate governmental interventions 
into the media order.”73   
  
ance of cross-ownership rule would stimulate free and diverse expression did 
not violate the First Amendment.  Id. at 794-95.  The decision upholding the 
cross-ownership rule in the Supreme Court has been quite influential.  It still 
stands as a leading precedent to justify government regulation of the struc-
ture of media ownership against First Amendment challenge.   The cross-
ownership rule assumes that the more diverse the ownership of broadcast 
stations within a community, the more diverse and participatory the content 
of broadcast programming will be.  Id. at 784. 
 71. Id. at 810. 
 72. In May 2000, the FCC, in a report dealing with a number of its owner-
ship policies, concluded that it should, as a general proposition, retain the 
cross-ownership rule “because it continues to serve the public interest by 
furthering the important public policy goal of viewpoint diversity.”   1998 
Biennial Regulatory Review — Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Own-
ership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Tele-
communications Act of 1996, 15 F.C.C.R. 11,058, 11,061, ¶ 4  (2000).  Does a 
national media ownership policy like the cross-ownership make sense as a 
communications policy?  Former FCC Chairman William Kennard said he 
believed that the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule served the public 
interest. Id. at 11,127.  At the same time, he suggested there were situations 
when it should not apply.  Diversity and competition would not be threat-
ened, for example, if a single radio station in a large market were allowed to 
combine with small suburban newspaper.  Id.  Former Commissioner Susan 
Ness’s comments about the cross-ownership policy were even more direct.  
Commissioner Ness said that sometimes the rule worked against, rather than 
for, diversity and competition in local markets. Id. at 11,129. She recalled the 
media world as it existed when the cross-ownership rule was adopted in 1975: 
“Back then, there were only three commercial broadcast networks; today, 
there are six or seven. . . . Then the rule was adopted, the big boom in cable 
franchising had not yet begun; today, cable television passes more than 97% 
of households of which approximately two-thirds subscribe.”  Id. at 11,129-30.  
She went on to point out that satellite broadcasting had not arrived in 1975.  
Id.  Today it has more than 10 million subscribers in the U.S.  Of course, the 
Internet, with its millions of subscribers, was unknown.  
 73. BAKER, supra note 1, at 265. 
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The FCC is presently rethinking both the cable audience cap 
and the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule.74  The pre-
sent FCC Chairman, Michael Powell, has expressed doubts 
about the wisdom of retaining them.75  On the other hand, the 
current Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, Sena-
tor Ernest Hollings, is supportive of them.76  Of course, even if 
  
 74. On September 13, 2001, the FCC began a rulemaking proceeding to 
consider revisions to its newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule.  See 
Amendment of Section 73.202(b), Table of Allotments, FM Broadcast Sta-
tions, 16 F.C.C.R. 2997 (2001). On September 13, 2001, the FCC also initi-
ated an inquiry into whether the regulatory approach reflected by subscriber 
limits or audience caps was “still appropriate.”  Third Report, supra note 51, 
at 19,100. The cross-ownership rule at a minimum is likely to be calibrated to 
a greater degree than is presently the case as a result of the FCC’s inquiry.  
As for the future of an FCC-imposed audience cap in cable, it was initially 
anticipated that the audience caps would be abandoned altogether as a con-
sequence of the FCC’s inquiry.  It is possible, however, that Enron Corp. and 
related scandals may now halt the deregulatory juggernaut. 
 75. In a February 6, 2001 press conference, Chairman Powell was asked 
whether he would try to eliminate the 35% audience cap in broadcasting.  His 
response was basically negative on the audience cap issue and yet equivocal 
at the same time:  
 
If competition were the only issue, I would most strenuously suggest 
that the cap has no purpose.  But there are other goals embedded in 
the Telecom Act, like diversity of viewpoints, that are much more 
visceral.  I’m skeptical that caps benefit consumers in the form of 
greater and more diverse products.  We have to be able to justify 
regulatory intervention on something more than sentiment.   
The Chairman Elucidates, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Feb. 12, 2001, at 34, 34.  
On September 13, 2001, the FCC announced an inquiry into the 30% audi-
ence cap rule in the cable industry in the light of the court of appeals decision 
setting it aside. See Time Warner II, 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Imple-
mentation of Section 11 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act of 1992 , 16 F.C.C.R. 17,312 (2001).  On September 13, 2001, 
the FCC also announced an inquiry into whether the cross-ownership rule 
barring common ownership of a broadcast station and daily newspaper in the 
same market should be revised. See Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations 
and Newspapers, 16 F.C.C.R. 17,283 (2001).  The tenor of both inquiries indi-
cates that the existing cable audience cap and the existing broadcast news-
paper cross-ownership rule will at a minimum undergo substantial revision if 
they survive at all. 
 76. See Paige Albiniak, Flip-Flop, Fritz: Senate Shift Returns Hollings to 
the CenterSeat on Commerce, BROADCASTING & CABLE, May 28, 2001, at 5.  As 
a result of the defection of Senator Jeffords of Vermont from Republican 
ranks and the resultant Republican loss of control of the Senate, Senator 
Fritz Hollings (Dem.-S.C.) has become Chairman of the Senate Commerce 
Committee.  Senator Hollings is expected to try to restrain network efforts to 
 
 4/19/02 6:39:34 PM 
2002] BAKER REVIEW 989 
these rules are retained in some form, one should be aware 
that they are susceptible to waiver or modification by the FCC.  
In short, existing structural rules have some force, but they are 
often evaded and their future is quite uncertain. 
VI. MEDIA POLICY IN CANADA 
Media concentration has recently undergone a period of mas-
sive expansion in Canada.  In 2000, the Canadian Radio-
Television and Telecommunications Commission (“CRTC”) ap-
proved an application by BCE Inc. (“BCE”), Canada’s largest 
telecommunications company, for the acquisition of one of Can-
ada’s largest television broadcasters, CTV Inc. (“CTV”).77  Be-
sides giving BCE an even greater presence in Canadian tele-
communications, the acquisition also presented serious cross-
ownership issues.  Prior to the CRTC hearing, there were press 
reports that BCE intended to acquire one of the country’s lead-
ing newspapers, The Globe and Mail of Toronto.78   Despite 
these issues, the CRTC approved the acquisition because of a 
“benefits package” offered by BCE which included expenditures 
of CA$230 million over a seven year period to benefit Canadian 
programming.  The CRTC noted that this sum included 
CA$140 million to be spent solely on developing “prime time 
Canadian programs of consistently high quality and in suffi-
cient quantity to attract significantly larger audiences and 
  
abolish ownership regulations as well as deregulatory efforts by the new 
Chairman of the FCC, Michael Powell: “While all observers say Hollings has 
a good relationship with Powell, they also say the two have very different 
views.  Powell is a champion of allowing market forces to operate; Hollings 
believes the big hand of government occasionally should be put to work.”  Id. 
at 6.  
 77. See 1406236 Ontario Inc. on behalf of CTV Inc., Decision CRTC 2000-
747 (Dec. 7, 2000), available at http://www.crtc.gc.ca/archive/ENG/Decisions/ 
2000/DB2000-747.htm [hereinafter CRTC 2000-747].  CTV held licenses to a 
number of television stations and pay and specialty services, including The 
Sports Network Inc., Le Reseau des Sports Inc., The Discovery Channel, The 
Comedy Network, CTV NewsNet Inc., and Outdoor Life.  Id.  ¶ 1.  For its 
part, BCE and its subsidiaries provide its customers with a wide mix of com-
munication services including in part local and long distance telephone ser-
vices, wireless services, satellite communications, terrestrial broadcasting 
distribution undertakings and Internet access.  See id. ¶¶ 3, 13, 16, 17 & 19. 
 78. See Canadians Need Diversity of Voices, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 20, 2000, 
at A26. 
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revenues.”79  The Globe and Mail, BCE and CTV are all now 
part of a giant conglomerate, Bell Globemedia.   
In July 2000, Hollinger, Inc., which is controlled by Canadian 
media magnate Conrad Black, sold thirteen major city daily 
newspapers plus half its share of the National Post to CanWest 
Global Communications Corporation (“Global”), which owns 
CanWest, the third largest English language television net-
work in Canada.80  In August 2001, the CRTC granted approval 
to the license renewal applications of television stations con-
trolled by Global.  When the CRTC renewed Global’s television 
licenses, it also renewed the television licenses of CTV.  Global 
has a potential audience reach of 97.6% of the English lan-
guage television market in Canada.  The CRTC granted ap-
proval despite the troubling cross-ownership issues involved in 
the applications for renewal.81  The CRTC did express concern, 
however, that ultimately there might be complete integration 
of the newspaper and television operations in the cities where 
Global had a cross-ownership situation, with the result that in 
some communities there would only be a single media editorial 
and news stance for both the electronic and print media.82  
  
 79. CRTC 2000-747, supra note 77, ¶ 30.  The purpose of this funding 
would be to “demonstrate to other broadcasters that Canadian entertainment 
programming can be successful and self-sustaining.” Id.  As a condition of 
approval, the CRTC required BCE to comply with rigorous annual reporting 
requirements to assure that the benefits package was “incremental to all 
existing and outstanding requirements.”  Id. at pmbl. 
 80. Conrad Black Sells 13 Dailies, Half-share in National Post , AGENCE 
FRANCE-PRESS, July 31, 2000, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File. 
 81. See generally License Renewals for the Television Stations Controlled 
by Global, Decision CRTC 2001-458 (Aug. 2, 2001), available at  
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/archive/ENG/Decisions/2001/DB2001-458.htm.  In the 
Vancouver-Victoria, British Columbia area, Global owns two television sta-
tions and three daily newspapers.  Id. ¶ 8. In Calgary, Alberta and Ottawa, 
Ontario, Global owned one of the two major daily newspapers in each city.  In 
Regina and Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Global owned the only major daily 
newspaper in each city as well as a television station in each city.  Id. ¶ 106. 
 82. See id. ¶¶ 102-7.  This integration could eventually result in a reduc-
tion in diversity of the information presented to the public and of the diver-
sity of distinct editorial voices available in the markets served.  For example, 
under a fully integrated structure, the same editor could decide what matters 
would be investigated and what stories would be covered by a commonly 
owned television station and newspaper.  Under such an integrated struc-
ture, the television station and the newspaper may no longer compete and 
might present a single editorial position and approach.  
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Therefore, the CRTC approved Global’s license renewal appli-
cations on the condition that Global keep the news manage-
ment for its television stations separate from the news man-
agement of its newspapers.  This condition was part of a 
Statement of Princ iples and Practices that the CRTC imposed 
on Global as a condition of license.83  The Statement also re-
quired Global to establish an impartial Monitoring Committee 
that would serve as a complaint mechanism for both the public 
and Global’s employees.84  Not surprisingly, the increase in 
cross-ownership in Canada is being hailed by Canadian media 
representatives as a reason for the economic health of the 
country’s media enterprises.85 
There is a much greater degree of cross-ownership in Canada 
than in the U.S.  During the past two years in Canada, two 
Canadian television networks, Global and CTV, have become 
parts of media corporations that own newspaper properties.86   
But the situation is somewhat relieved by the fact that in many 
Canadian cities where Global owns a television station and a 
daily newspaper, at least one other daily newspaper is operat-
ing.  In short, the one newspaper town is much less common in 
Canada than in the U.S.  In addition, in all Canadian cities, 
there is competition in radio and television. 
In still another cross-ownership development, Quebecor, Inc. 
(“Quebecor”), a Canadian media corporation, has acquired 
Groupe TVA Inc. (“TVA”), a French language network.87   Que-
becor owns such daily newspapers as Le Journal de Montréal 
as well as The Toronto Sun, The Ottawa Sun and The Edmon-
ton Sun.  In order to quell the controversy its cross-ownership 
of newspaper and television properties generated, Quebecor 
itself developed a remarkably strict code of ethics which pro-
vides that its newspaper and television reporters “can’t work in 
[the] same building, communicate in person, by phone, fax or 
  
 83. Id. at app. 1. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Tom Cohen, Convention Highlights Differences Between U.S., Cana-
dian Newspaper Businesses, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES (May 6, 2001), at 
http://wire.ap.org. 
 86. See Commons Committee Launches 18-month Study to Amend Broad-
casting Act, CANADIAN PRESS, May 10, 2001, 2001 WL 21163929. 
 87. See Cross-Ownership is Issue in Canada, TELEVISION DIGEST, May 7, 
2001, 2001 WL 7882002. 
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Internet, or share equipment.”88  Quebecor’s new code, separat-
ing the newsrooms of its newspaper and television properties, 
is another example of the Canadian approach to cross-
ownership and media concentration.  Quebecor will also estab-
lish a committee to monitor the separation between its news-
papers and television stations.89    
New media mergers in Canada during the past two years 
have understandably occasioned a great deal of interest in the 
problem of cross-ownership in Canada.  On December 7 and 8, 
2000, I spoke at a conference held in Montreal that was spon-
sored by the Laval University Center of Media Studies.  The 
Center was asked by Heritage Canada and the CRTC “to study 
the impact of current trends in media cross-ownership in the 
contexts of the mergers and strategic alliances of large media 
groups.”90   I was struck by the distinctively Canadian ap-
proach to the cross-ownership issue.  In the initial paper circu-
lated to the participants, one of the questions the participants 
were asked to address particularly characterized this Canadian 
perspective: “Short of requiring structural separation or forbid-
ding cross-ownership between broadcasters and print media, 
what mechanisms or safeguards could be put in place to pro-
mote or foster the diversity and plurality of editorial voices?”91   
The working paper setting forth the issue stated that, al-
though the issue of cross-ownership could certainly be ad-
dressed on the basis of an economic analysis, the conference 
would be directed to discussing the problem of cross-ownership  
“from a democratic or political angle.”92  In this respect, of 
course, such a vantage point has been taken in the U.S.  As 
mentioned previously, the cross-ownership prohibition in the 
U.S. was upheld by the Supreme Court on the basis of First 
Amendment values rather than an economic analysis.  But 
what is uniquely Canadian is that an actual cross-ownership 
prohibition, while not off the table, was not the focal point of 
  
 88. Id.   
 89. See id. 
 90. LAVAL UNIV. CTR. OF MEDIA STUDIES, MEDIA CROSS-OWNERSHIP: ISSUES 
AND ARGUMENTS (2000) (on file with Journal).   The conference was held at 
the École des Hautes Etudes Commercial, Montreal, Quebec, Canada on De-
cember 7-8, 2000.   
 91. Id.   
 92. Id. 
 4/19/02 6:39:34 PM 
2002] BAKER REVIEW 993 
the conference.  Yet, there was a great deal of interest in the 
cross-ownership prohibition in the U.S. by the audience at the 
conference’s open meeting when I explained the cross-
ownership rule in the United States. I emphasized the need, if 
the rule is retained, to calibrate it more sensitively so that it 
makes sense when applied in quite differing cross-ownership 
situations.  I was interviewed by Canadian Broadcasting Cor-
poration (“CBC”) radio on the American cross-ownership 
prohibition and asked whether Canada should adopt an across-
the-board cross-ownership prohibition.93  It was a strange 
question.  There was no likelihood that such a prohibition 
would be adopted in Canada.  The reason for this, of course, is 
obvious — it is too late.  The mega-mergers are, in large part, 
done deals.  The cross-ownerships are already in place.   
Therefore, to propose a cross-ownership rule in Canada would 
be to discuss locking the barn door after the horse has been 
stolen.   Why is there no general cross-ownership rule in Canada?  
The answer probably has a great deal to do with preservation 
of Canadian culture and the maximizing of Canadian content 
in the Canadian media.  The rationale is that if media concen-
tration, including cross-ownership, is allowed to take place, the 
Canadian media will be financially strong enough both to resist 
foreign — or perhaps more specifically — American media 
competition, and to develop Canadian content.  Indeed, at li-
cense renewal hearings for Canada’s two private commercial 
television networks, CTV and Global, the networks explained 
the case for media concentration to the CRTC.94  In light of 
competition from television stations along the U.S. border, the 
development of new specialty channels and the emergence of 
the Internet, they argued it is essential that Canadian televi-
sion networks become larger markets if they are to compete 
and survive.95 
The contemporary Canadian solution to the cross-ownership 
problem is separation of the newsrooms and editorial offices of 
newspaper and television properties owned by the same com-
  
 93. École des Hautes Etudes Commerciales (CBC radio broadcast, Dec. 8, 
2000).  
 94. See generally License Renewals for the Television Stations Controlled 
by Global, Decision CRTC 2001-458 (Aug. 2, 2001), available at  
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/archive/ENG/Decisions/2001/DB2001-458.htm. 
 95. See Cross-Ownership is Issue in Canada, supra note 87. 
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pany.  As we have seen, the CRTC has conditioned approval of 
mergers involving cross-ownership on newsroom separation of 
television stations and newspapers.  This has generated a good 
deal of criticism in Canadian media circles.  Anthony Wilson-
Smith, Editor of Maclean’s, argued that this proposal may 
make sense to bureaucrats but doesn’t make much sense else-
where: “If you outlaw potential synergies and resultant effi-
ciencies in news-gathering operations, that makes these prop-
erties even less desirable as a business proposition.”96  In the 
U.S., approving cross-ownership on condition of newsroom 
separation might give rise to First Amendment-based chal-
lenges alleging impermissible government intervention into 
editorial autonomy and journalistic judgment. 
Generally, Canada has dealt with concentration of ownership 
problems on an ad hoc basis.97  Professor Baker argues that 
capture of global media by a few multinational media conglom-
erates may be resisted by making domestic media stronger.98  
The case of Canada is instructive in this regard.  On March 24, 
2000, a majority of the members of the CRTC approved an ap-
plication that would permit CTV, a commercial English televi-
sion network reaching 99% of English-speaking households in 
Canada, to acquire an 80% interest in NetStar Communica-
tions, Inc. (“NetStar”), provided CTV met certain conditions.99  
  
 96. Anthony Wilson-Smith, The CRTC vs. Free Speech (?), MACLEAN ’S, 
May 14, 2001, at 2, 2. 
 97. See Matthew Fraser, We’re About to Find Out if Big Really is Beauti-
ful: Hearings to Review License Renewals of CTV, Global TV, NATIONAL POST, 
Apr. 2, 2001, at C2. “The CRTC does not have an explicit media concentration 
and cross-ownership policy.”  Id.  Professor Florian Sauvageau informs me 
that Canada did briefly have a cross-ownership policy.  During the 1980’s 
following the Royal Commission on Newspapers, the government of Prime 
Minister Pierre Trudeau and his Liberal Party issued a directive to the CRTC 
that it should not grant or renew broadcast licenses to applicants who con-
trolled daily newspapers in the same market.  This directive was withdrawn 
by the subsequent Conservative Party government of Prime Minister Brian 
Mulroney.  Interview with Professor Florian Sauvageau, Director, Laval Uni-
versity, Center of Media Studies, in Quebec, Canada (Sept. 14, 2001). 
 98. See BAKER, supra note 1, at 261-66. 
 99. See CTV Inc. on Behalf of The Sports Network Inc. (TSN), Le Réseau 
des Sports (RDS) Inc., and 2953285 Canada Inc. Operating as the Discovery 
Channel, Decision CRTC 2000-86 (Mar. 24, 2000), available at 
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/archive/ENG/Decisions/2000/DB2000-86.htm. The 
CRTC described NetStar as a “pioneer and leader in Canadian specialty tele-
vision” and listed its holdings as follows: 
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One of the conditions demanded by the CRTC was that CTV 
divest itself within a year of its 40% interest in CTV SportsNet, 
Inc. (“SportsNet”).100  CRTC Commissioner David McKendry 
wrote a dissenting opinion denying that CTV’s acquisition of 
NetStar would raise “significant competition issues.”101  More 
importantly, he made a strong case for concentration of owner-
ship in Canada by Canadian media, stating:  
We are in transition to an environment of virtually unlimited 
global choices for entertainment and information.  The policy 
and regulatory challenge is to facilitate the availability of Ca-
nadian choices in this environment. Once the transition is 
complete, the opportunity for Canadian broadcasters who are 
not strong may be at risk in a world where the Internet knows 
no borders.  The Commission voiced this concern with respect 
to new media when it announced its decision not to regulate 
the Internet: “The CRTC is concerned that any attempt to 
regulate Canadian new media might put the indu stry at a 
competitive disadvantage in the global marketplace.”  The 
Commission defined new media services “to be those [ser-
vices] that are delivered by means of the Internet.”   
As Global Television Network stated in the Commission’s 
hearing to consider CTV’s application, “All of us, our com-
pany, the CTV group, all of us are trying find our way in a 
new environment.  This environment requires strong Cana-
dian broadcasters with the resources to provide Canadians 
with Canadian choices in an entertainment and information 
world that is increasingly without borders. 102    
Canada has acquiesced in cross-ownership and in concentra-
tion of ownership at the national level.  But has it led to the 
  
 
NetStar owns, directly or through a subsidiary, 100% of The Sports 
Network (TSN) and le [sic] Réseau des Sports (RDS) inc. [sic] (RDS), 
an 80% interest in the Discovery Channel (Discovery), as well as a 
non-controlling interest of 24.95% in Viewer’s Choice Canada Inc. 
(Viewer’s Choice), a company involved in pay and pay-per-view tele-
vision services. 
Id.  
 100. Id.  The rationale for requiring CTV to divest itself from SportsNet is 
that, as a result of CTV’s acquisition of NetStar, CTV was acquiring the most 
popular sports channel in Canada, The Sports Network, Inc., as well as other 
specialty channels.  Id.  
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
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creation of a culture of dialogue?  Of course, there is some di-
versity of ownership and content within the Canadian media.  
As already pointed out, competition in the intra-city daily 
newspaper market still exists.  In addition, Canadian public 
broadcasting is an important source of diverse programming.  
CBC has 10% of the English-speaking television audience and 
Radio Canada has 20% of the French-speaking television audi-
ence.103  The Canadian dilemma has been well expressed by a 
Canadian critic, Richard Stursberg. There is a “trade off be-
tween diversity of voice within the country versus diversity of 
voice in a North American context.”104  In order to be able to 
protect Canadian media products, concentration of media own-
ership in Canada has been tolerated to an even larger extent 
than is the case in the U.S.    
The Canadian media experience is a good laboratory for some 
of Baker’s ideas.  An examination of recent Canadian experi-
ence shows that resistance to globalism may be at the expense 
of true dialogue.  The recent acceleration in patterns of concen-
tration of ownership of the media in Canada will perhaps pre-
vent the Canadian media from being dominated by either 
American or global media concerns.  But it is hard to see how 
the concentration of most of the print and electronic media in 
Canada in the hands of two or three companies can be expected 
to support or create the culture of dialogue sought by Professor 
Baker. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In his chapter on “Trade and Economics,” Professor Baker 
argues that one way to measure market preferences would be 
to “identify the media people would choose in the market if 
  
 103. See Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Annual Report: English Tele-
vision, at http://cbc.radio-canada.ca/htmen/6_2_2_3_00.htm (last visited Apr. 
21, 2002); Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Annual Report: French Tele-
vision, at http://cbc.radio-canada.ca/htmen/6_2_2_4_00.htm (last visited Apr. 
21, 2002); Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Annual Report: English Tele-
vision, at http://cbc.radio-canada.ca/htmen/6_2_2_3_99.htm (last visited Apr. 
21, 2002); Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Annual Report: French Tele-
vision, at http://cbc.radio-canada.ca/htmen/6_2_2_4_99.htm (last visited Apr. 
21, 2002). 
 104. See Canada by Design, Telecable Communications: Home Wired, at 
http://www.candesign.utoronto.ca/wk4txt.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2002).     
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they all had equal wealth.”105    Basically, the approach to the 
market that Baker advocates is an approach which, as he puts 
it, gives priority to the political: “A democratic one-person-one-
vote criterion is obviously a much more egalitarian criterion 
than is the market’s willingness-and-ability-to-pay.”106  He 
would not apply this egalitarian oriented governmental inter-
vention approach to individual preferences for all media 
goods.107  For example, he would not apply such an approach to 
entertainment content.  But, he believes “a more egalitarian 
weighting” is appropriate for cultural and educational prod-
ucts.108 Egalitarian weighting of individual preferences can jus-
tify appropriate governmental intervention to preserve or in-
crease diversity beyond that which the market could, or can be 
expected to provide.109  Regulation of the domestic media con-
tent market is justified to nourish “domestically relevant news 
and local cultural materials.”110         
National media policies, Baker argues, should be developed 
to avoid domination of the media, whether on the global or na-
tional level, by “elites, whether corporate, technical, or gov-
ernmental.”111  The idea here is that the capture of local or na-
tional media by global or multinational media corporations can 
be resisted by national regulation of the domestic media con-
tent market in order to nourish “domestically relevant news 
and local cultural materials.”112  The problem with this is that 
the types of government intervention in media structure Baker 
favors are under siege or in retreat.  I have referred earlier to 
structural restrictions on ownership in the U.S. in order to 
show how restrictions, albeit “weak” ones, have been developed 
in the U.S.  The present outlook does not indicate that these 
restrictions will be expanded.  On the contrary, the future they 
confront is substantial modification or repeal altogether.    
  
 105. BAKER, supra note 1, at 243. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. at 243-44. 
 108. Id.  A policy of egalitarian-oriented government intervention is most 
applicable to “media goods most related to matters such as education, the 
vote, and maybe the creation of cultural contexts in which people can develop 
the capacity for autonomous choice.”  Id. at 243. 
 109. See id. at 243-44. 
 110. BAKER, supra note 1, at 244. 
 111. Id. at 266. 
 112. Id. at 244. 
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Domestic media, if properly structured by national govern-
ments, may serve as an effective antagonist to global domi-
nance by multinational corporations and whatever harms they 
may pose to the emergence or maintenance of a culture of dia-
logue in democratic societies.  Still, one problem remains.  In 
Western democracies, the national media is dominated by an 
increasingly small number of media organizations that are 
multinational corporations themselves.113  In both the U.S. and 
Canada, real efforts are being made to halt or limit the scope of 
these developments, but success is hardly certain.  
Professor Baker is a champion of the “culture of dialogue.”    
So am I.  But if one looks at the current state of American law 
in its regulation of the broadcast and cable industries, we find 
that many of the existing regulatory policies which were de-
signed to maintain a culture of dialogue have been abandoned 
or greatly weakened.  The “fairness doctrine,” which required 
the balanced presentation of controversial ideas of public im-
portance over the life of the broadcast license period has been 
abolished.114  This doctrine was in effect from 1949 to 1987.115    
Although never enforced with particular fervor, the fairness 
doctrine by its very name suggested that dialogue and debate 
were appropriate goals for broadcasting.  Indeed, the very sym-
bolic character of the fairness doctrine in this regard made it a 
particular target of those within the broadcast industry who 
  
 113. The manner in which American media corporations have become 
global media giants was illustrated by the details of a deal between Fox Fam-
ily World Wide and Disney Entertainment Corporation (“Disney”).  Disney is 
reportedly paying $3.2 billion for the Fox Family Channel.  See George 
Hager, Disney to Purchase Fox Family for $3.2 Billion Deal Would Expand 
Cable Reach in USA, 50 Other Countries, USA TODAY, July 23, 2001, at B1.  
Eighty million U.S. cable viewers subscribe to the Fox Family Channel. Fox 
Family Channel was owned by Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation of Amer-
ica and Haim Saban’s Saban Entertainment.  Id.  On Monday, July 23, 2001, 
Disney announced that it would buy Fox Family World Wide, owner of the 
cable Family Channel and other cable properties.  Acquisition of the Fox 
Family Channel will give Disney ownership of the Fox Kids International 
channels which operate in fifty countries in Europe and Latin America, or an 
additional thirty-four million cable subscribers.  Id.  
 114. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987). 
 115. The fairness doctrine was set forth by the FCC in the Report on Edito-
rializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949) and was abolished by 
the FCC in 1987 in Syracuse Peace Council, supra note 114.  The FCC’s deci-
sion was upheld in Syracuse Peace Council v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 
867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
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denied that government could demand any obligation of broad-
casters, save the single one of assuring them their licenses and 
thus freeing them from competition.  The license renewal proc-
ess — which examined at renewal time, among other things, 
whether the broadcast license has provided the community 
which it served with programming concerning the problems 
and issues of that community — has barely any teeth left.116  
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 virtually assures renewal 
to incumbent licensees since it is a rare licensee who will not be 
able to meet its bare public interest requirements.117 
In his chapter on “Trade and Culture,” Baker argues that 
“free trade [in media products] will not provide the media 
products that people in various countries desire or that their 
democracies require.”118  On the other hand, he is quite aware 
that free trade in media content is not a negative across the 
board, noting that free trade in media content may be particu-
larly desirable in countries ruled by repressive regimes.119  As 
mentioned above, Baker has been influenced by Professor 
Goodenough’s distinction between “strong” protection of domes-
tic media content, which is not favored, and “weak” protection 
of domestic media content, which is.120 An example of the disfa-
vored strong protection would be a national media policy, 
which excluded foreign media content altogether.  Baker, how-
ever, is aware of the inevitability of disagreement about the 
application of such distinctions.  Accordingly, he concludes that 
possibly the best solution for decision-making about free trade 
in media content, and the extent to which it should be re-
stricted or regulated, would be to leave the entire area to “na-
tional discretion — that is, to exempt cultural materials from 
all free trade agreements.”121  
Professor Baker concludes his chapter on “Trade, Culture 
and Democracy” by suggesting that international human rights 
  
 116. See generally Mark D. Schneider, Renewal Procedures and Expectancy 
Before and After the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 14 COMM. LAW. 9 
(1996). 
 117. See Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 309(K)(1)(A) (1994). 
 118. BAKER, supra note 1, at 266. 
 119. Id. at 235. 
 120. See Oliver R. Goodenough, Defending the Imaginary to the Death? Free 
Trade, National Identity and Canada’s Cultural Preoccupation, 15 ARIZ. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 202, 209-10 (1998). 
 121. BAKER, supra note 1, at 270. 
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law might be developed to preclude strong protectionism and at 
the same time to nurture weak domestic regulation of media 
content.122  At the same time, he is aware that the First 
Amendment has been manipulated to serve the interests of 
corporate media firms on the national level in this country and 
that a parallel manipulation could occur with respect to inter-
national human rights documents.123  
Professor Baker prophesies that corporate media efforts to 
derail a just national media order through international hu-
man rights law will be as unsuccessful as corporate efforts in 
this country have been when they sought to set aside govern-
ment regulation whose purpose was to protect and preserve 
local media.124  Although, historically, efforts to throttle struc-
tural regulation of the media in the name of the First Amend-
ment have generally been unsuccessful in the Supreme Court, 
they have met with a larger measure of success in more recent 
years in the federal courts of appeal.125  Additionally, it is by no 
means certain that the Supreme Court’s refusal thus far to 
adopt the position of the large media corporations will endure.  
  
 122. Id. at 274. 
 123. Id. at 271-73.  Indeed, Baker provides an example of a response to an 
international report dealing with global communications that is not terribly 
supportive of any hope that international bodies or agreements support a 
culture of dialogue any time soon.  He points to the example of the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”) 
sponsored MacBride Commission Report’s conclusion that “in many parts of 
the world, government would need to play a significant role in promoting a 
better communications order.”  Id. at 272.  This conclusion generated a good 
deal of criticism from both the American Bar Association and the U.S. State 
Department.   Professor Baker suggests that the real source of the criticism 
was not in professed sorrow about damage to “First Amendment values.”  Id. 
Rather, the source was a visceral reaction to the MacBride Report’s recom-
mendation that in “expanding communication systems, preference should be 
given to non-commercial forms of mass communication” and that public funds 
should aid in this endeavor. Id. at 272-73.  Indeed, the MacBride Report and 
similar expressions from UNESCO officials caught fire from critics who 
“seemed to equate corporate interests — free trade and corporate dominance 
— with the meaning of the First Amendment and international human 
rights.”  BAKER, supra note 1, at 273. 
 124. Id. at 273. 
 125. For a recent example, see, e.g., Time Warner II, 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001) (striking down the FCC’s limit on the audience reach any one cable 
entity may have and remanding the issue of the appropriate audience reach 
to the FCC). 
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Justice Clarence Thomas, for example, has been very clear that 
the only interests the First Amendment protects are those of 
the owners of the media.126  A majority of the Supreme Court 
has not endorsed this narrow conception of First Amendment 
protection, but it is not inconceivable that this position may 
gain more adherents on that Court. 
National media in the U.S. has been quite successful in be-
ginning to dismantle the existing structure of regulation.  The 
national media is now itself a division of multinational compa-
nies.  I think it is likely that these multinational media compa-
nies will play a similar dominant role on the global stage that 
their national units play on the national stage.  If there is go-
ing to be a culture of dialogue and a more just and egalitarian 
communications order, I agree with Baker that the first and 
most appropriate stage of battle should be the national arena.  
My basic criticism of Professor Baker is that he underestimates 
the difficulties in preserving, never mind constructing, a na-
tional media order through government intervention in democ-
ratic societies that bears any real resemblance to his desired 
culture of dialogue.   
In the U.S., a regulatory structure still exists for the older 
electronic media, but it is clearly under attack.  In Canada, 
prospects for such a structure are even dimmer.  Media, Mar-
kets and Democracy makes a valuable contribution in showing 
that free trade in media content is not invariably beneficial to 
the health of free societies although it might be very beneficial 
to societies that are not free.  The book shows the importance of 
preserving governmental intervention in the national commu-
nications order.  Baker has provided an unusually thoughtful 
  
 126. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. Fed. 
Communications Comm’n, 518 U.S. 727, 816-17 (1996) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice Thomas stated: 
 
We implicitly recognized in Turner [I] that the [cable] programmer’s 
right to compete for channel space is derivative of, and subordinate 
to, the operator’s editorial discretion.  Like a freelance writer seeking 
a paper in which to publish newspaper editorials, a programmer is 
protected in searching for an outlet for cable programming, but has 
no freestanding First Amendment right to have that programming 
transmitted. . . .  Likewise, the rights of would-be viewers are deriva-
tive of the speech rights of operators and programmers. 
Id. at 816-17. 
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and informed discussion of a subject — free trade in media con-
tent — where it is often concluded too quickly that simply to 
state the issue is to resolve it.  In so doing, Professor Baker pro-
vides a rare and learned voice, which hopefully will be heard 
against the tide.  
 
